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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Partridge: Expanding The
Scope Of Insurance Liability In California
JAMES J. MARCHIANO*
In 1973 the California Supreme Court outlined a new approach to
realizing increased insurance coverage in deciding the case of State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge.' The Partridge
case presents the possiblity of multiple insurance coverage for an injury
arising from concurrent, individually-insured negligent acts, and appears
to be a significant addition to the assortment of instances wherein
coextensive policy coverage is available. As a result, attorneys are pro-
vided with an untapped potential of additional monetary relief for the
injured plaintiff as well as the possibility of additional insurance cover-
age for the tortfeasor.
The purpose of this article is to examine the Partridge case in order to
identify the factors which influenced the supreme courts decision to
make new law in the insurance field, as the identification of these factors
is crucial to the attorney seeking to use the Partridge decision for the
benefit of his client. The article then focuses on a comparison of the
traditional concept of overlapping insurance coverage and the emerging
concept of multiple insurance coverage,2 and how these concepts are
* A.B., 1965, St. Patrick's College; J.D., 1969, University of California, Berke-
ley. Member: State Bar of California. The author is a partner in the firm of Bledsoe,
Smith, Cathcart, Boyd & Eliot, San Francisco, California.
1. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
2. For the purposes of this article, the term "overlapping coverage" refers to the
situation where two or more policies of insurance are construed so as to provide in-
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affected by the Partridge decision. Finally, the discussion analyzes the
possible impact of Partridge on the rights and duties of involved insur-
ance carriers.
THE PARTRIDGE FACTS
In Partridge, the litigation arose from a gunshot injury sustained by a
passenger in the insured's automobile. Essentially, the injured's cause of
action for negligence was based upon two acts: first, that the insured
had filed the trigger mechanism of his pistol in order to avail himself of
the hunting advantages of "hair-trigger" action, and second, that at the
time of the discharge of the pistol, he was driving his automobile on
rough, off-the-road terrain, chasing rabbits at night with the gun in his
hand.3 The tortfeasor was insured for liability under both an automobile
policy and a homeowner's policy. A declaratory relief action was com-
menced by the insurer to determine which of the two policies provided
coverage under these facts, the automobile policy or the homeowner's
policy. The automobile policy contained the following language:
[The insurer] agrees . . . [t]o pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of (A) bodily injury sustained by other per-
sons . . . caused by accident arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use, including loading or unloading, of the owned motor
vehicle .... 4
The homeowner's policy provided:
[The insurer] agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury or property damage, to which this insur-
ance applies, caused by an occurrence. 5
The homeowner's policy, however, expressly excluded coverage pertain-
ing to:
. . . Bodily Injury or Property Damage Arising Out of the Owner-
ship, Maintenance, Operation, Use, Loading or Unloading of...
demnity for an injury caused by a single negligent act. The term "multiple coverage"
refers to the situation where two or more policies are construed to cover two or more
independent negligent acts which have concurred to cause a single injury. Hence, under
multiple coverage, each insurer is obligated to indemnify the insured for the injury prox-
imately caused by one of these distinct acts of negligence. Although this nomenclature
is not universally accepted in the insurance area, the author feels that it most adequately
identifies the two types discussed in this article. It should be pointed out that the su-
preme court did not make any distinction between the different coverages in Partridge.
The court utilized the term "overlapping coverage" throughout its opinion to refer to any
situation where more than one policy was found to provide indemnity for an injury.
3. 10 Cal. 3d at 99-100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
4. Id. at 98 n.4, 514 P.2d at 126 n.4, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.4.
5. Id. at 99 n.5, 514 P.2d at 126 n.5, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.5.
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[a]ny Motor Vehicle Owned or Operated By, or Rented or
Loaned to, any Insured .... 6
The court recognized that the language of the automobile policy and of
the exclusionary clause of the homeowner's policy were nearly identical,
and that both policies were issued by the same company. Nonetheless, it
held that both policies afforded coverage for the insured's obligation to
the injured party.7 In so holding, the court found that both the act of
filing the trigger mechanism and the act of driving off the road in
pursuit of rabbits were independent proximate causes of the injury
jointly resulting in the insured's liability.8 In the court's language: "both
[negligent acts] are concurrent proximate causes of the accident, the
negligent driving constituting an intervening, but non-superseding,
cause of the accident." 9
In an attempt to invoke the provisions of the homeowner's policy's
exclusionary clause, the insurer argued that although the two independ-
ent negligent acts did concurrently cause the injury, both acts "arose out
of the use ". . . of a motor vehicle."'1 The court held that a question of
construction was presented respecting the breadth of the phrase "arising
from the use of an automobile," but that by applying the well estab-
lished rules of insurance contract interpretation, the argument that the
two policies were mutually exclusive was without merit." The court
stated that the language "arising from the use," when appearing in a
coverage clause of an insurance policy, must be given a "broad and
comprehensive application. ' 2 Depending upon the factual setting of the
case, "almost any causal relation with the vehicle," not necessarily with
the use of the vehicle, will suffice to provide coverage. 3 As a conse-
quence, under a coverage provision, it is probable that both of the
negligent acts involved in Partridge would have been deemed to have
"arisen from the use of an automobile," or to have been auto-related.
6. Id. at 99 n.6, 514 P.2d at 126 n.6, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.6.
7. Id. at 101, 514 P.2d at 128, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
8. Id. at 104-05 & n.10, 514 P.2d at 130-31 & n.10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19 &
n.10.
9. Id. at 104 n.10, 514 P.2d at 130 n.10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818 n.10.
10. Id. at 101, 514 P.2d at 128, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
11. Id. The Partridge court, in rejecting the insurer's arguments, reiterated the fol-
lowing clearly accepted rules of insurance policy construction. Coverage clauses are in-
terpreted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible protection. E.g., Ensign v. Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 47 Cal. 2d 884, 888, 306 P.2d 448, 450 (1957); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437-38, 296 P.2d 801, 809-10 (1955). On
the other hand, exclusionary clauses are interpreted narrowly against the insurer. E.g.,
Prickett v. Royal Ins. Co., 56 Cal. 2d 234, 237, 363 P.2d 907, 909, 14 Cal. Rptr. 675,
677 (1961); Arenson v. Nat'l Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 83, 286 P.2d 816,
818 (1955).
12. Id. at 100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
13. Id. at 101-01, 514 P.2d at 127-28, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
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Conversely, however, it has been consistently held that exclusionary
clauses are to be interpreted narrowly against the insurer.14 Obviously
these interpretational rules are designed to provide the broadest possible
coverage for the insured by guaranteeing that all ambiguities, including
the most insignificant, will be decided in favor of the insured and
against the insurer. Thus the court, in determining the applicability of
the exclusionary clause in the homeowner's policy, narrowly construed
the phrase "arising from the use of an automobile" in accordance with
the aforementioned rules and held that the injury resulting from the
filing of the trigger mechanism did not arise from the "use" of the auto-
mobile,1" notwithstanding the fact that the reckless driving of the in-
sured was undoubtedly a factor which contributed to the gun's discharge.
Therefore, insofar as the act of filing the mechanism was concerned,
the exclusionary clause was held inapplicable. However, since the other
act of driving off the road with a loaded pistol was obviously auto-
related, the coverage provision of the automobile policy was in effect
with respect to that act.1" The holding of the court, therefore, made both
of the insurance policies available to the insured, and thus to the injured
party, for the single injury suffered.
COVERAGE BY MORE THAN ONE POLICY
BEFORE PARTRIDGE
Prior to Partridge, the circumstances under which an insured could
look to more than one policy to cover his liability for negligence
involving an automobile were limited in number, but were not uncom-
mon in occurrence. 17 This type of coverage often arose due to an overlap
of the language in the insured's liability policies. For example, every
time one operates a non-owned automobile, two and possibly more
policies may overlap and be called into play: the owner's policy insuring
against accidents arising out of the "ownership" of the vehicle and the
"omnibus" provision of the driver's policy insuring against accidents
arising out of the use, maintenance, operation, loading, or unloading of
a non-owned automobile.18 The coverage under both a homeowner's
policy and an automobile owner's policy will also overlap in the usual
instance where the injury arises from the use of an automobile on or
near the premises of the insured.19 And, of course, in such a case, if the
14. Id. at 101-02, 514 P.2d at 128, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 816. See also authorities
cited at note 11 supra.
15. Id. at 103, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
16. Id. at 106, 514 P.2d at 132, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
17. See generally Marcus, Overlapping Liability Insurance, 16 DEF. L.. 549(1967) [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
18. Id. at 549.
19. Id. at 553-54. It should be pointed out here that most exclusionary clauses
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driver is not the owner of the car, it is possible that a third policy, the
driver's "omnibus" coverage, may be applicable.20
Overlapping coverage may also obtain with respect to comprehensive
public liability and automobile policies where the injury has occurred
during the process of loading or unloading a motor vehicle. Due to the
enormously flexible interpretational rules employed by the courts in
reaching equitable coverage arrangements, a number of courts have
broadly interpreted the coverage provisions of automobile policies and
have held that loading or unloading does not cease until the entire
operation is "completed." 2' 1 In one case this reasoning was extended to
bring into effect the automobile coverage of the owner of a delivery
truck when a store employee, while checking goods being loaded onto
the truck, bumped a pedestrian on the sidewalk.22. Another case in
which public liability and automobile liability insurance were held to
overlap involved an injury caused by an employee of a parking garage
who was moving'a customer's car to provide additional parking space.23
The court found that, in addition to the owner's consent coverage under
the automobile policy, there was coverage under the public liability
policy of the garage notwithstanding its exclusionary clause pertaining
to injuries arising from the use, operation, maintenance or ownership of
a vehicle of any description. 24 By narrowly construing the term "use" in
the exclusionary clause, the court decided that the attendant was not
"using" the automobile; to "use" means to put to one's personal use,
which the attendant certainly had not done with respect to the involved
automobile.25
Prior to the Partridge decision, there were no California cases holding
that the negligent driver of an automobile owned by him was entitled to
coverage under a comprehensive personal liability (homeowner's) poli-
cy in addition to an automobile policy where the accident occurred off
the insured's premises. In part this may have been attributable to the
impact of Herzog v. National American Insurance Co.26 In Herzog, the
in comprehensive personal liability insurance policies (homeowner's policies) expressly
do not apply to instances in which the family automobile is used on the premises of
the home, or on the ways immediately adjoining them. Id. at 554.
20. Id. at 554.
21. The "completed operations" rule is the most widely-accepted approach used to
define "loading and unloading" of an insured automobile. The alternative "at rest" rule
which placed a more restrictive interpretation on what constitutes loading and unloading
has been largely rejected in the United States. The "efficient cause" theory, requiring
the establishment of a casual connection between the loading or unloading of a vehicle
and the injury, enjoys only the most limited acceptance. See id. at 559-64.
22. Wagman v. Am. Fidelity Cas. Co., 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952).
23. Challis v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 117 Ind. App. 180, 69 N.E.2d 178
(1946).
24. Id. at 182, 69 N.E.2d at 179.
25. Id.
26. 2 Cal. 3d 192, 465 P,2d 841, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1970).
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insured argued that, in light of the announced public policy to incorpo-
rate within automobile liability insurance policies all relevant statutory
provisions,2  California Vehicle Code Section 1645128 expanded the
provision of his homeowner's policy which provided automobile cover-
age for use "on the premises and the ways immediately adjoining" his
property to provide coverage for accidents occurring "within the conti-
nental limits of the United State." 29 Essentially the insured's argument
was that his homeowner's policy was, in fact, an automobile liability
policy, and thus should cover clearly auto-related risks. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that the small
premiums and the type of information sought upon application for the
policy indicated that general automobile liability coverage was not con-
templated by the insured or the insurer.80 This court, however, merely
reiterated what has always been the case regarding exclusions of auto-
related risks from homeowner's policy coverage: risks which are con-
strued to arise from the use of an automobile will not be covered under
the ordinary homeowner's policy.
Although Herzog did not deal with alternative constructions of the
phrase "arising from the use of an automobile," it is possible that the
case has caused some consternation regarding the efficacy of future
assertions of overlapping homeowner and automobile insurance cover-
age where conspicuously auto-related acts of negligence are involved.
Whatever the reason, there had been no successful attempt to extend
coverage under more than one policy to accidents involving an owner-
driver occurring away from the home premises or the ways adjoining
thereto until the Partridge decision.
CONCURRENT CAUSATION AS A NEW PATH TO
MULTIPLE INSURANCE COVERAGE
Overlapping coverage potentially results from alternative broad and
27. id. at 196, 465 P.2d at 842, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 706. See Wildman v. Gov't Em-
ployees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 40, 307 P.2d 359, 364-65 (1957).
28. An owner's policy of motor vehicle liability insurance shall insure the
person named therein and any other person, as insured using any owned motor
vehicle with the express or implied permission of said [insured], against loss
from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of ownership, main-
tenance, or use of such motor vehicle within the continental limits of the
United States to the extent and aggregate amount, exclusive of interest and
costs, with respect to each motor vehicle, or fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000)
for bodily injury to or death of each person as a result of any one accident
and, subject to said limit as to one person, the amount of thirty thousand dol-
lars ($30,000) for bodily injury to or death of all persons as a result of any
one accident and the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to
property of others as a result of any one accident.
CAL. VEI. CODE §16451 (emphasis added).
29. 2 Cal. 3d at 196, 465 P.2d at 842, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
30. Id. at 197, 465 P.2d at 843, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
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narrow constructions of the phrase "arising from the use of an automo-
bile," which thereby render a single act auto-related for purposes of
coverage under the automobile policy, but nonauto-related for purposes
of the exclusionary clause in the homeowner's policy. This type of
coverage has not been found to exist, with the exception of situations
involving loading and unloading of the owned automobile, 31 in the
common situation where a negligent act has been committed by the
owner-driver of an automobile away from home. Assuming that a large
proportion of automobile accidents could fall within the above category,
a means by which multiple coverage can be afforded should be of
enormous benefit to both the plaintiff seeking resources and to the
defendant facing the unhappy prospect of an insurance deficiency.
Partridge, although not a case involving overlapping coverage, suggests
that multiple coverage might be realized upon a finding of two or more
independent acts of negligence, each constituting a proximate cause of a
single injury.32
As mentioned above, the Partridge court found two separate negli-
gent acts: first, filing the trigger mechanism of a pistol to create a "hair-
trigger" action; second, pure and simple reckless driving. 33 Moreover,
the court found that each independent act was a proximate cause of the
single injury.34 Finally, the court determined that one act, the reckless
driving, was auto-related and thus covered under the automobile poli-
cy;35 the other act of filing the pistol's trigger mechanism was held to be
nonauto-related for purposes of the homeowner's policy's exclusionary
clause, and was thus covered by that policy.36 It is important to note that
by narrowly construing the "use" language of the homeowner policy's
exclusionary clause the court ignored the fact that the gun would not
have discharged and caused the injury had it not been for its use during
the operation of the automobile. Therefore, there is at least a tenable
argument that even this portion of the owner-driver's negligence was
auto-related, which suggests that the court's approach was somewhat
result-oriented. This being the case, it appears that the courts may,
under the proper circumstances, be persuaded to reach the same result
in future cases notwithstanding minor factual dissimilarities with the
Partridge case. The decision is thus significant because it suggests a
means by which an innovative attorney might avail his client of the
31. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra.
32. The meaning of the terms "overlapping" and "multiple" coverage has previ-
ously been identified. See note 2 supra.
33. 10 Cal. 3d at 99-100, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
34. Id. at 102, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
35. Id. at 100-01, 514 P.2d at 127-28, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
36. Id. at 103, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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benefits of multiple coverage in situations where even the most liberal
courts have not yet extended overlapping coverage.
The isolation of two or more independent negligent acts concurring to
cause an injury is, it appears, a prerequisite to securing the benefits
Partridge will bestow, i.e. coverage under both a homeowner's and an
automobile policy. Some examples may serve to illustrate the concur-
rence of auto and nonauto-relatMd negligent acts visualized as a Par-
tridge-situation: first, an injury is caused when the driver of the insured
automobile, operating the automobile in an erratic manner, drops a
lighted firecracker which he had intended to toss out the window;
second, an injury is caused when the driver of the insured automobile,
while proceeding too rapidly over speed-control bumps in a residential
development, drops a lighted cigarette onto the gasoline-covered floor of
the automobile; third, an injury is caused when a hunting rifle, kept
cocked with the safety off in the gunrack of the insured's pickup truck,
discharges while the truck is being driven in an erratic manner. The
number of instances in which auto and nonauto-related negligent acts
can be found to concur in causing an injury is as great as the creativity
of the mind of the attorney seeking multiple coverage. This could be
particularly true in light of the narrow construction courts will utilize
when interpreting "arising from the use of an automobile" in an exclu-
sionary clause of a homeowner's policy. 7 An act which initially appears
to bear "some causal connection ' 38 with the use of the insured automo-
bile may be narrowly construed, as in Partridge, to have not arisen from
"the use of an automobile," thereby rendering inapplicable the exclu-
sionary provisions.
It might be argued that in order to satisfy a court of the existence of
a Partridge-type factual situation, there must be a clearly auto-related
negligent act concurring with another nonauto-related negligent act
to cause an injury. As the examples and the Partridge case illustrate,
this second act may approach recklessness or be inherently dangerous;
e.g., filing the trigger mechanism of a pistol, tossing lighted firecrackers
from a window, smoking in the immediate presence of gasoline, or
carrying about a cocked and unsecured hunting rifle. However, an
attorney wishing to avail his client of the benefits of multiple coverage
where the facts are not conducive to a finding of overlapping coverage
should be alerted by any auto accident caused by a driver preoccupied
with an activity other than his driving.
37. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 101, 514 P.2d
123, 128, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816 (1973); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Rich, 49 Cal. App.
3d 390, 395, 122 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699 (1975).
38. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 101 n.8, 514 P.2d 123, 128 n.8, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811. 816 n.8,
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This conclusion is somewhat supported by the recent decision in
Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Rich,39 which used the Partridge rationale
to find coverage under a homeowner's policy in a case involving an
automobile. Although Glens Falls did not involve coverage under more
than one policy, the case is significant because it indicates that the
California courts are willing to remove the barriers created by the
exclusionary clause of a homeowner's policy, even in fact situations
where there is not a great degree of negligence or recklessness. In Glens
Falls the insured, while driving on a logging road in a Travelal automo-
bile, saw a squirrel sitting on a stump. He brought his vehicle to a stop
and reached across his body to open the door with his right hand while
reaching under the seat for the shotgun with his left hand. As he
touched the stock, the shotgun went off and injured the third party
plaintiff, even though the safety had been on.40 The court held that a
homeowner's policy would provide coverage for the third party plain-
tiffs claim for injuries arising out of the negligent firing of the shot-
gun.41 It refused to accept the argument that the insured was unloading
a dangerous instrument from a vehicle, which would constitute an
accident arising out of the "use' of an automobile which would be ex-
cluded from coverage under the homeowner's policy.42 The court per-
mitted recovery because the cause of the accident did not involve the
"use" of the vehicle. Under the court's analysis, the accident did not
arise so clearly from the use of the automobile as it did from the insured's
use of the shotgun, or conversely, the use of the shotgun caused the acci-
dent at least as much as the use of the automobile.43 Therefore, since the
shotgun was not being used in a dangerous fashion by the insured, the
case arguably could stand for the proposition that the nonauto-related
act need not approach recklessness in order for the Partridge rationale to
apply.
A possible limitation on the length to which California courts will go
in a Partridge-type situation to remove the barrier created by a home-
owner's policy's exclusionary clause may be suggested by United Serv-
ices Automobile Association v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,44 a
recent intermediate appellate decision. This case involved a dispute as to
whether an automobile policy and/or a homeowner's policy would
provide indemnity for an injury. The court refused to construe as
39. 49 Cal. App. 3d 390, 122 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1975).
40. Id. at 392, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
41. Id. at 394-95, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
42. Id. at 395-96, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
43. Id. at 397, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
44. 36 Cal. App. 3d 765, 111 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1973).
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nonauto-related an injury which arose when the insured tossed a burn-
ing can of gasoline away from an automobile .4 He had been attempting
to start the automobile by priming the carburetor with gasoline from the
can when the fuel ignited.4 6 In holding the "entire sequence of events"
to be auto-related, the court reasoned that "while the activity involving
the vehicle was peripheral it was not an activity wholly disassociated
from, independent of and remote from its use. '47 According to the
court, "using" an automobile necessarily includes activities seeking to
make the automobile operative; priming the carburetor with gasoline, it
concluded, is a common method used to start an automobile which has
run out of fuel. 8 This holding suggests that California courts will refuse
to give effect to the exclusionary clause in a homeowner's policy by
narrowly construing the phrase "arising from the use of an automobile"
only to the extent that the assertedly nonauto-related act remains clearly
divorced from the normal operating procedures of the involved auto-
mobile.
United Services, however, can be distinguished from the Partridge
situation and thus may not be a limitation at all. In United Services, the
controversy arose in the context of a potential overlap of coverage since
only one negligent act was involved, i.e. tossing the burning can of
gasoline. As a consequence, the United Services case involved a declara-
tion as to which of the two involved insurance carriers, the automo-
bile or the homeowner's carrier, would be required to indemnify the
insured. Hence, the court had to examine the "sequential relationship"
of the single negligent act with the use of the automobile. Since it found
this act to be auto-related, the homeowner's exclusionary clause was of
necessity applicable, and therefore coverage under that policy was pre-
cluded.49 This would have been the result in Partridge had there not
been the second, nonauto-related negligent act, i.e. the filing of the
trigger mechanism. However, since that case did involve a second negli-
gent act, the Partridge court was able to find coverage under the
homeowner's policy with respect to that act. This requisite second act
was not present in the United Services fact situation and thus, once the
court found the sole negligent act to be auto-related, it could not have
found coverage under the homeowner's policy without resorting to
overlapping coverage.
It should be noted that while the "sequential relationship" of the
45. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
46. Id. at 767, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
47. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
48. Id. at 770, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
49. Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
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negligent act or acts with the use of the automobile is a factor of prime
importance, there are other factors inherent to a situation where overlap-
ping coverage is at issue. These factors would undoubtedly include
procurement of the broadest coverage available to the insured and an
examination of the relative size of the premiums paid for each policy. 0
However, in a multiple coverage situation such as that before the court
in Partridge, there will be no need to consider these other factors
because the existence of two negligent acts should enable a court to find
coverage under both policies. If such is the case, a court will not be
forced to make a choice between coverage under one policy or the other
and then to adapt its rules of construction accordingly."' Therefore,
United Services should.have little effect, if any, upon a Partridge-type
situation because different circumstances and considerations are in-
volved. In further support of this conclusion, it should also be pointed
out that the United Services court did not gainsay multiple coverage in a
Partridge-type setting, noting that the two situations are distinguisha-
ble .1 2 Thus, it would seem that the case would present little difficulty for
the attorney seeking the benefits of Partridge.
RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES BETWEEN COINSURERS
An encounter with multiple liability insurance coverage arising under
a factual situation similar to Partridge necessarily brings to bear the
frustrating and recurring dilemma of determining rights and duties
between coinsurers. Prior to Partridge, this dilemma ordinarily arose
where an overlapping coverage situation was presented, e.g., an acci-
dent involving a nonowner-driver of an automobile where both the
owner's liability policy and the nonowner-driver's omnibus coverage are
applicable.53 Determining the availability of contribution, primary and
excess liability, -the existence of a duty to defend the insured, and the
existence and extent of an obligation to contribute to the defense or
settlement, costs, is a first order priority in the above situation. However,
Partridge does not present a situation of overcoverage, due to the fact
that each of two negligent acts is independently insured. Thus the
potential hazards encountered in determining reciprocal rights and
50. See Herzog v. Nat'1 Am. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 192, 197, 465 P.2d 841, 843, 84
Cal. Rptr. 705, 707 (1970).
51. The statement above implies that many insurance cases may be result-oriented.
The author believes that a fair reading of Partridge indicates this to be true of at least
that case. See text preceding note 37 supra. Due to the enormous flexibility of the
interpretational rules with regard to insurance contracts, it may be, in the proper case,
a simple matter for a court to find coverage under the policy or policies it wishes.
52. 36 Cal. App. 3d 765, 772, 111 Cal. Rptr. 595, 599.
53. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
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duties between coinsurers may be obviated to some degree by a finding
of multiple coverage.
A. The First Step: Reciprocal Rights of Insurers-Determining the
Extent to Which Each Policy Must Offer Coverage
Only in the most unusual case-does the inquiry raised by overlapping
policy coverage reduce itself to the simple question of which policy is
primary and which is excess; that is, which policy must exhaust its
coverage and which need only cover the deficiency, if any. In the usual
case the issues which arise in the analysis of reciprocal rights of insurers
will involve the reconciliation of other-insurance clauses, which are
contained as a matter of standard procedure in most liability insurance
policies.
Generally speaking, there are three types of other-insurance clauses in
use today: the prorata clause, the excess clause, and the escape clause.
The prorata clause in substance proclaims that in the event of the
existence of other "valid and collectible insurance,' 'es .the policy contain-
ing the clause will provide coverage only for that amount of the liability
equal to the proportion of the limits of this policy to the total amount of
valid and collectible insurance."6 For example, if the limit of a policy
containing such a clause is $100,000 and there is other valid and
collectible insurance for $50,000, the coverage of the first policy will
extend to two-thirds of the total amount of the liability or to the policy
limits, whichever is the lesser amount. The excess clause provides that in
the event there is other valid and collectible insurance, the policy
containing the clause will provide coverage only to the extent that such
54. The rules of insurance policy construction are generally governed by the law
of contracts. Therefore, the manifest intent of the parties will control unless the agree-
ment violates the law or is contrary to public policy. Billington v. Interinsurance Exch.,
71 Cal. 2d 728, 742, 456 P.2d 982, 990, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326, 334 (1969); Linnastruth
v. Mut. Benefit etc., Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 216, 218, 137 P.2d 833, 834 (1943). Yet, itis still unclear in California whether the terms of the insurance contract concerning
other insurance control over the parties' right to indemnification. Compare Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d 144, 153, 57 Cal. Rptr. 240,247 (1967) (insurance contract controlled indemnification rights) with Rossmoor Sani-
tation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 634, 532 P.2d 97, 104, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449,
456 (1975) (right of indemnification controlled contract containing other-insurance
clauses). The author believes that apportionment of the loss pursuant to other-insurance
clauses would effectively negate the indemnification agreement, thus imposing liability
on a party which had expressly bargained to avoid such a result. Such a result seems
contrary to the freedom of contract.
55. Insurance is "valid and collectible" if the terms of the policy are construed to
cover the particular risk involved, and remains such notwithstanding the existence of
technical grounds upon which the insurer could have otherwise avoided disbursement to
the insured, e.g., a failure by the insured to give timely notice of an accident to the in-
surer. Marcus, supra note 17, at 552-53.
56. Russ, The Double Insurance Problem-A Proposal, 13 HAST. L.i. 183, 184 n.4(1961) [hereinafter cited as Russ].
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other insurance, applied to its limits, is deficient.57 In other words, any
other obligated insurance carrier will be the primary insurer. It should
be noted, however, that an excess clause is not tantamount to a "true
excess policy" which, in consideration for lowered premiums, is express-
ly excess in operation with respect to another specified policy of insur-
ance.5" The condition precedent of exhaustion of a primary policy is
bargained for in this instance, and the excess policy will provide excess
coverage only, regardless of the presence of other-insurance clauses in
the other specified policy.59 Finally, the escape clause states simply that
in the event of the existence of other insurance, the policy containing the
clause shall provide no coverage whatsoever.60 That is, the nonexistence
of other valid and collectible insurance is an express condition precedent
to the operation of a policy containing this clause.
The advantages inuring to a carrier by including other-insurance
clauses in his policies, and the corresponding disadvantages suffered by
carriers faced with such clauses who may be left holding the proverbial
bag, are so patent that a policy without such a clause will be rare.
Consequently, most liability policies do contain other-insurance clauses,
and the melange of problems which arises from the need to reconcile
such clauses diminishes the advantages to be gained from the availability
of coextensive policy coverage. It is in this respect, however, that Par-
tridge once again emerges as a potentially invaluable tool by which the
insured may realize the benefits of multiple coverage without suffering
the inconvenience of the protracted litigation necessary to extricate
opposing inconsistent other-insurance clauses.
In order to fully comprehend the value of Partridge in this context it
is first necessary to explore what has been called the dilemma of
"interlacing" other-insurance clauses,6 one of the most perplexing areas
of insurance law.62 A number of commentators have dealt with various
aspects of this subject, 63 and there seems to be at least tacit agreement as
to its complexity. The reconciliation or "interlacing" of opposing other-
57. Id. at 184 n.5.
58. Id. at 192.
59. See Reed v. Pac. Indem. Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 151, 158-59, 225 P.2d 255,
260 (1950); Russ, supra note 56, at 192.
60. Russ, supra note 56 at 184, n.6.
61. Marcus, supra note 17 at 570-76.
62. One federal court has stated that "[PMrobably in no field of law is there more
confusion among the courts as to the proper rule to be followed than in the field of
excess insurance." Ins. Co. of Texas v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp.
143, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
63. E.g., Note, Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 319 (1965); Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage, 40
DEN. L.J. 259 (1963); Comment, "Other Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. REV.
147 (1952); Comment, Effect of Conflicting "Other Insurance" Clauses, 41 WASH. L.
REv. 564 (1966).
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insurance clauses is often the task faced whenever two or more valid and
collectible insurance policies are applicable to a given situation. In such
cases, there will always be a clash of terms requiring resolution unless
the only other-insurance clause presented is of the prorata variety, in
which case coverage will be extended according to the formula an-
nounced above. 64 Any other combination of clauses is inherently incon-
sistent and will require judicial reconciliation. For example, if more than
one policy is valid and collectible, one policy containing an excess clause
and the other a prorata clause, the excess clause will demand that the
policy containing the prorata clause cover the liability up to its policy
limits, while the prorata clause will insist that the policy containing the
excess clause cover the liability on a prorata basis. In a situation where
the clauses are of the prorata and escape varieties, the predicament is
identical. Where each policy contains an excess clause, in effect each
maintains that the other is liable and both insurers refuse to pay. The
same result obtains when one clause is of the escape variety and the
other is of the excess type, or where all policies contain escape
clauses.
The method of judicial reconciliation enjoying the widest use
throughout the United States is called "pairing." 5  This approach
prescribes certain uniform results depending only upon what pair of
other-insurance clauses is presented. Under this method, where the
other-insurance clauses are of the same sort, the policies will always be
prorated. 6 Thus, where there are opposing excess or escape clauses, the
treatment will be precisely the same as if both clauses were prorata
clauses, i.e. each policy will offer a portion of the amount of the liability
equal to, but not in excess of, that proportion of the overall combined
total of insurance coverage represented by each policy.6 7
Unfortunately, no uniform result has been reached where the other-
insurance clauses are of different varieties, i.e. prorata and either escape
or excess, or escape and excess. In cases where the opposing clauses are
of the prorata and excess varieties, the majority rule requires that the po-
licy with the prorata clause be deemed the "other valid and collectible
insurance." 68 Thus, in essence, the prorata clause is disregarded and the
64. See text accompanying note 56 & 57 supra.
65. See Russ, supra note 56, at 186-87.
66. See Oil Base, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 299 P.2d
952 (1956) (excess clauses); Trader's & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 130
Cal. App. 2d 158, 278 P.2d 493 (1955). There are no reported California cases dealing
with escape clauses. Two cases from other jurisdictions have held that escape clauses
are mutually repugnant and thus the coverage must be prorated. Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Chappell, 246 So. 2d 498 (Miss. 1971); Drude v. Ryals, 216 So. 2d 647 (La. 1969)
cert. denied, 253 La. 734, 219 So. 2d 513 (1969).
67. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
68. See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
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excess clause is given effect. Although its cases have been divided,""
California probably is in accord with the majority rule in light of the
supreme court's decision in American Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Republic Indemnity Co. 7 1 In American Automobile, a nondriver-owned
auto was involved in an accident. The driver's policy contained other-
insurance clauses of both the excess and prorata varieties, while the
owner's liability policy was of the prorata type. 71 The court reasoned
that the insurers intended that the excess clause in the driver's policy be
given effect, which was evidenced by their use of the "standard" insur-
ance policy forms.72 This decision has been consistently followed by
subsequent appellate courts and thus it seems safe to say that California
courts have adopted the majority rule.73 On the other hand, in situations
where one policy contains a prorata clause and the other an escape
clause, the California cases have disregarded the escape clause and
prorated both policies.74
Where the opposing clauses are of the excess and the escape varieties,
the majority of states and California generally refuse to enforce the
escape clause.75 However, California differs from the majority in its
treatment of the excess clause. Under the majority rule, the excess clause
is honored and primary liability is imposed on the insurer who has
utilized the escape clause,7 6 which in effect penalizes him for attempt-
ing to evade liability under the policy. California, however, has taken a
more moderate stance, insisting that the coinsurers prorate the coverage,
notwithstanding the express policy language. 77 Indeed, this posture
appears to be a step toward what could possibly be called the ultimate
69. See Donahue Constr. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 7 Cal. App. 3d 291, 301-
03, 86 Cal. Rptr. 632, 639-40 (1970), which examined and cited the two lines of Cali-
fornia decisions dealing with the prorata-excess dilemma.
70. 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959).
71. Id. at 509-10, 341 P.2d at 676.
72. Id. at 512-13, 341 P.2d at 678.
73. See, e.g., Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 33
Cal. App. 3d 26, 34, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 743 (1973). Owens Pac. Marine, Inc. v. Ins.
Co. of No. America, 12 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668-69, 90 Cal. Rptr. 826, 830-31 (1970);
Donahue Constr. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 7 Cal. App. 3d 291, 301-03, 86 Cal. Rptr.
632, 639-40 (1970).
74. E.g., Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 622-
23, 301 P.2d 602, 606-07 (1956). However, in policies covering liability arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, by statute in certain situations,
escape clauses are given effect and thus will not be prorated. CAL. INS. CODE §§11580.1,
11580.9; see also Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transport Idem. Co., 6 Cal. 3d 496, 492
P.2d 673, 99 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1972).
75. See Russ, supra note 56, at 187.
76. E.g., Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1941); Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938); Grasberger
v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939).
77. See, e.g., Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 102
Cal. App. 2d 188, 227 P.2d 53 (1951). But see Underground Constr. Co. v. Pac.
Indem. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 62, 122 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1975) (giving effect to the escape
clause).
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solution to the interlacing dilemma: across-the-board proration of
coverage.
Across-the-board proration was first utilized in 1952 by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Oregon Auto Insurance Co. v. U.S. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co., 78 which involved a clash between an escape clause
and an excess clause. The court expressly rejected all previously accept-
ed methods used to reconcile other-insurance clauses, stating that where
a repugnancy of terms exists, both clauses must be disregarded and the
insurance coverage prorated. 79 By imposing a proration where ever such
a repugnancy exists, however, the court transformed all other-insurance
provisions into the prorata type, thereby effectively eliminating both the
escape and excess varieties. This simple solution of prorating insurance
coverage in all cases of overlapping coverage appears to be gaining
support in the western states, particularly in Oregon8" and California. In
a recent California appellate decision involving two prorata clauses, the
court, by dicta, reiterated the position adopted in Oregon Auto and
recommended the across-the-board proration approach of reconciling
inconsistent other-insurance clauses. 81 However, as of this time, no
California court has gone so far as to adopt the Oregon Auto approach,
possibly due to the infringement upon individual freedom to contract
involved therein.8 2
In light of its adhesion to a modified version of "pairing," as illustrat-
ed above, it would appear that the California judiciary is unlikely to
adopt in toto the Oregon Auto method of proration at the present time.
This conclusion seems warranted by the California Supreme Court's
decision in American Automobile. As mentioned previously, the court
recognized that the intent of the parties to the nonowner-driver's insur-
ance policy, as reflected by the use of standard insurance forms and in
the premium schedule, was that the insured would be fully and primarily
covered only with respect to expressly considered vehicles; accidents
78. 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
79. Id. at 960.
80. The Oregon Auto rationale has since been adopted by the Oregon Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Sparling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 Or. 471, 439 P.2d 616 (1968); Lamb-
Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959). The case
is also being followed in the federal circuit that originally decided it. Globe Indem.
Co. v. Capital Ins. & Sur. Co., 352 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1965). Additionally, it appears
that Ohio may be in the process of adopting Oregon Auto; see Fleming v. Parsons, 2
Ohio App. 2d 12, 206 N.E.2d 46 (1965).
81. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 417, 428, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 91, 98 (1974), vacated 13 Cal. 3d 622, 532 P.2d 97, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1975)
(making no mention of Oregon Auto).
82. As noted previously, the manifest intent of the parties to the insurance policy
will control unless the agreement violates the law or is contrary to public policy. Bill-
ington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 742, 456 P.2d 982, 990, 79 Cal. Rptr.
326, 334 (1969); Linnastruth v. Mut. Benefit etc., Ass'n., 22 Cal. 2d 216, 218, 137 P.2d
833, 834 (1934).
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emanating from the insured's use of nonowned automobiles were to be
covered only to the extent that other valid and collectible insurance
proved deficient.8 3 There has been no indication since this case was
decided, at least in the area of nonowned automobile liability coverage,
that California is prepared to disregard contractual intent to the extent
demanded by Oregon Auto.
Possibly the ultimate solution to the interlacing dilemma will have to
be the legislation effecting a compromise between the strict prorata
approach suggested in Oregon Auto and the widely utilized "pairing"
method,8 4 which, unhappily, is of no aid where more than two other-
insurance clauses require reconcilation. It is possible, however, that this
entire tangle can be circumvented by successfully invoking the Partridge
rationale of multiple liability insurance coverage for an insured.
As mentioned above, Partridge is not a case involving overlapping
coverage, due to the concurrence of two independent acts of negligence
to cause a single injury. Therefore, since each negligent act was covered
by a separate policy of insurance, as to each act, neither the home-
owner's nor the automobile policy could possibly have been "other valid
and collectible insurance." With respect to the risk of injury from
reckless driving the only valid and collectible insurance was undisputed-
ly the automobile policy. Similarly, with respect to the risk of injury
from the negligent filing of the pistol's trigger mechanism, the home-
owner's policy was the only valid and collectible insurance. Had either
policy contained an other-insurance clause, there could have been no
repugnancy of terms requiring the difficult task of reconciliation. There-
fore, the finding of multiple coverage in a Partridge-type fact situation
will usually provide a means of avoiding the problems encountered
when other-insurance clauses come into conflict in the overlapping
coverage situation.
It should be noted that the necessity to reconcile other-insurance
clauses could arise in a Partridge-type situation in some instances. For
example, had the insured been driving a nonowned automobile at the
83. 52 Cal. 2d 507, 510-11, 341 P.2d 675, 678-79.
84. One commentator has proposed legislation to solve this problem, which in
many ways represents a compromise approach. He suggests three basic provisions: (1)
escape provisions should be eliminated entirely; (2) proration should be utilized in any
situation where two or more other-insurance clauses are used; and (3) the use of excess
clauses should be limited to policies insuring the operation of nondriver-owner automo-
biles. Russ, supra note 56, at 191-93.
One California appellate court has also urged that legislation be adopted in this area
of insurance law. The court stated that it was "persuaded that definite statutory rules
which will obviate this large volume of intricate litigation would be plainly in the pub-
lic interest." Truck Ins. Exeh. v. Jones, 193 Cal. App. 2d 483, 488 n.3, 14 Cal. Rptr.
408, 411 n.3 (1961).
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time of the injury, the reckless driving risk would have been insured by
both ,the driver's liability policy and the policy of the owner of the auto-
mobile. In such a factual setting any other-insurance clauses respecting
the reckless driving risk would have to be reconciled in order to deter-
mine the reciprocal rights of the coinsurers. However, as between these
insurers and the homeowner's liability carrier, no disputes could arise
because the automobile liability coverages would not be "other valid and
collectible insurance" respecting the trigger mechanism filing risk. Thus,
even in the aforementioned situation, the Partridge decision may act as a
vehicle by which an attorney may obtain maximum insurance coverage
for his client without facing the entire array of problems presented by
other-insurance clauses.
B. The Second Step: Reciprocal Duties of Insurers-Defense of the
Insured, Contribution of Defense and Settlement Costs
Reciprocal duties of insurers do not, of course, arise from their
respective contracts with the insured because there is no privity of
contract between or among the various insurance carriers. As a result,
the duties between insurers flow from principles of equity rather than
from contractual obligations individually owed to the insured for
indemnity.8 5
Normally, the defense of the insured will be undertaken by the
primary carrier if there is one.8 6 In addition, if this defense is not
adequate or complete, the excess insurer may have a cause of action
against the primary carrier for bad faith. 87 It stands to reason, therefore,
that the carrier facing the greatest potential liability in a prorata situa-
tion will wish to supervise the defense in an attempt to effectively
minimize his obligations under the policy. However, all involved insurers
are duty-bound to either defend or defray defense expenses if requested
to participate by the insured.88 A carrier with a smaller financial interest
in the outcome of an action cannot, under the principles of equitable
subrogation, escape liability for its ratable portion of the defense or
settlement costs by refusing to participate in the defense.8 9
85. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 196, 318 P.2d
84, 86 (1957).
86. Woodhead, Duty to Defend-Primary and Excess Insurance (California), 42
INs. COUNSEL J. 128, 128 (1975). However, in a conflict of interest situation, the in-
sured can select his own attorney and may be entitled to reimbursement for attorney's
fees incurred. Executive Aviation, Inc. v. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799,
94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
87. Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1963); Ivy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958).
88. Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 37, 366 P.2d 455, 461,
17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 18 (1961).
89. Id.
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The Partridge case presents special problems for insurance carriers
with respect to the above considerations. In a typical Partridge situation,
both the homeowner's policy and the automobile policy occupy primary
insurer roles due to the fact that each policy is providing coverage for a
separate negligent act committed by the insured. This factual setting
differs from a situation involving overlapping coverage, where, as men-
tioned above, the insurer with the greatest financial involvement will
usually undertake the supervision of the defense. In this latter setting, all
insurers have contracted to indemnify the insured against a single negli-
gent act causing an injury, and thus it is reasonable that the degree of
financial involvement will be a key factor in determining which carrier is
responsible for conducting the defense. However, in a Partridge setting,
since more than one act of negligence has resulted in a single injury,
giving rise to primary liability on the part of two insurers, it follows that
both should be obligated to pursue an active role in the defense,
notwithstanding the relative degree of their financial involvement. It
would not seem to comport with accepted principles of insurer defense
obligations that one insurer would be responsible for supervising the
defense relative to a risk for which he has not contracted to afford
coverage.
As mentioned previously, concomitant to the duty to participate in
the defense is the coinsurers' obligation to bear the settlement and
defense costs if called upon to do so.9" In a Partridge situation, where
arguably each primary insurer is obligated to actively participate in the
defense, it follows that each is also obligated to actively participate in all
settlement activities.
This position is strengthened when one considers the ramifications of
a bad faith refusal to settle by either an excess or ratably less-involved
coinsurer. The California Supreme Court has made it clear in Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co. 1 that the refusal to participate in a reasonable
settlement, based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
may result in liability to the insured for damages resulting from a verdict
in excess of policy limits. 92 Such damages may also include compensa-
tion for mental suffering, as well as punitive damages. 93
The impact of Crisci has been augmented by a very recent supreme
court decision in Johansen v. California State Automobile Association
90. Id.
91. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
92. Id. at 430-31, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
93. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. For an in-depth discus-
sion of the Crisci rationale, see Comment, Silberg v. California Life Insurance Com-
pany: A New Dimension In The Tort Of Insurer Bad Faith?, 6 PAC. LJ. 590 (1975).
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Inter-Insurance Bureau,94 in which the court held that an insurance
company breaches the implied covenant of good faith whenever it fails
to accept any reasonable settlement offer that is within the policy limits
of its insured. 95 In Johansen, the insurer rejected a settlement offer for
the amount of its policy limits in the belief that it was not liable under
the policy. After this rejection, the case went to trial and a verdict was
returned against the insured in excess of the settlement offer. The
assignee of the insured then sued the insurer for the difference between
the settlement offer and the subsequent verdict.96 The court held that
even if it had been subsequently determined that the insurer was in fact
free from liability under the policy, the insurer took its chances when it
refused to settle with the personal injury plaintiff.97 According to the
court, the insurer in such a case must settle and then seek reimburse-
ment from the insured.98 Hence, the net result of Crisci and Johansen is
that an insurer is probably best advised to accept any settlement offer
within its policy limits, even though the chances of a verdict in that
amount may appear slight.99
The consequences of a bad faith refusal to settle as contemplated by
the Crisci and Johansen decisions become particularly important in a
Partridge situation. For example, assume that the coverage carried by
the insurer of "risk A" is $100,000, and the coverage carried by the
insurer of "risk B" is $50,000. The risk A insurer, having a greater
financial interest in the outcome of the action, i.e. a two-thirds prorata
share of the eventual disbursement, will probably wish to take charge of
the defense and settlement of the action. If this insurer, however,
receives a settlement offer in excess of its policy limits, e.g., $120,000,
to which the coinsurer refuses to contribute its ratable portion, no
settlement will be possible. Thus, even if this first insurer is willing to
pay off the settlement offer to its policy limits of $100,000, it probably
cannot remove itself from the litigation due to the conduct of the other
primary, but less financially-involved, insurer. Consequently, if the liti-
gation culminates in a verdict in excess of the aggregated policy limits of
both carriers, leaving the insured liable for the excess, the refusing
94. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
95. Id. at 15-16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
96. Id. at 13-14, 538 P.2d at 746-47, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
97. Id. at 15-16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
98. Id. at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
99. See id. at 17 n.6, 538 P.2d 749 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. 293 n.6. In a footnote
the Johansen court left open the issue of whether an insurer must accept any settlement
offer within its policy limits, regardless of its reasonableness. However, the court im-
plied that it saw good reasons for adopting such a rule. This rule has already been
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Co. of Am., 65 NJ. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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insurer will arguably be liable to the insured for the entire deficiency
under the rationale of Crisci and Johansen.
This does not, however, help the first insurer who was willing to settle
and who could have escaped further liability by paying $80,000 of the
settlement offer, i.e., two-thirds of the total settlement of $120,000.
Therefore, since bad faith cannot be asserted against this insurer be-
cause it could not have accepted the settlement alone, one can argue that
it should have a cause of action against the other insurer for bad faith
refusal to settle. This result would appear to be a logical extension of the
Crisci-Johansen rationale, which is obviously aimed at encouraging
insurance settlements and thus discouraging prolonged litigation.100 If
such a cause of action were not allowed, one primary insurer would be
at the mercy of the other, even though one carrier is willing to make full
indemnification for the risk for which it contracted to provide coverage.
The second insurer's failure to pay off its coverage for the risk it
contracted to insure should not result in detriment to the insurer who is
willing to accept a settlement.
Although granting the insurer acting in good faith a cause of action
against the bad faith insurer is certainly an equitable solution to this
problem, it could be argued that the uniqueness of a Partridge situation
demands that stronger sanctions be imposed against this latter carrier.
As noted throughout this article, a Partridge situation contemplates the
concurrence of two or more negligent acts causing a single injury.
Consequently, two or more carriers are brought in as primary insurers,
each obligated to provide indemnification relating to only one of the
negligent acts. Thus, in this multiple coverage situation we do not find
two or more insurers jointly obligated to provide indemnification for a
single negligent act. Applying these considerations to the hypothetical
situation posed above, it can be argued that tender of its policy limits by
the insurer of "risk A" in partial satisfaction of a settlement offer should
serve to relieve it from further involvement in the litigation. As a result,
the entire burden of defending the action would be placed upon the
other primary carrier who refused to disburse the remainder of the
settlement. This first insurer should not be required to remain a party to
the litigation if it is willing to discharge all of its contractual obliga-
tions. 1' 1 In addition, the insured will be protected because the other,
100. This result would also comport with the rule followed by some other jurisdic-
tions that a primary insurer can be liable to the excess insurer for a bad faith refusal
to settle. E.g., Am. Fidelity & Cas. Inc. Co. v. All Am. Bus Line, 190 F.2d 234 (10th
Cir. 1951); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Home
Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1972).
101. Although a primary insurer will normally have the contractual duty to defend
the insured, it would seem that this duty should be excused in the case where one pri-
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non-settling primary carrier will still be obligated to defend the action,
which is what it apparently wishes to do in light of its failure to settle.
CONCLUSION
Partridge represents one more avenue for obtaining the benefits of
multiple insurance coverage for an injured plaintiff. The case suggests a
manner by which the innovative attorney may tap other resources for his
client without resorting to the already strained rules of insurance con-
tract interpretation by asserting the existence of overlapping coverage.
Hence, a search for two causative factors producing an injury may well
lead to multiple sources of compensation for an injured client. Although
this article has attempted to furnish some guidance in determining
whether a particular factual setting has the earmarks of Partridge, it
must be recognized that at least to a small extent, the Partridge court
relied upon its desire to provide adequate coverage for the insured in
reaching its interpretational conclusions. Therefore, future attempts to
retrace Partridge must necessarily be on an ad hoc basis, with the
creativity and preparation of the attorney playing a key role.1°2
On the other side of the coin, the duty to defend or settle the insured's
case is reduced to the far simpler concern of adequacy of representation
mary insurer has refused to settle. The refusing insurer will still be contractually obli-
gated to defend the insured in the action, hence there should be no hardship for the
insured in that respect. Perhaps the California legislature should study this potential
problem and take any appropriate legislative steps.
102. The practitioner who is confronted with a possible Partridge-type situation
should be aware of cases with factual situations similar to Partridge, but with varying
results. The following cases found coverage under an automobile policy only: e.g.,
Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 990(10th Cir. 1972); Uniguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.2d
865 (10th Cir. 1972); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Lott, 273 F.2d 500 (5th Cir.
1960); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Landfried, 348 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. Pa. 1972); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Morari v. At. Mut. Fire Ins.,
Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 468 P.2d 564 (1970); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Civil
Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 26, 108 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1973); National
Indem. Co. v. Corbo, 248 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1971); Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Ida. 22,
501 P.2d 706 (1972); Cagle v. Playland Amusement Inc., 202 So. 2d 396 (La. 1967);
Suburban Serv. Bus Co. v. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1128, 183 S.W.2d 376(1944); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 312 A.2d
664 (1973); Travelers Ins., Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1973).
The following cases either did not find coverage under an automobile policy or found
liability only under some other nonautomobile policy: e.g., Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
379 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1967); Richland Knox Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360
(6th Cir. 1967); Wirth v. Maryland Cas. Co., 368 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky. 1973); Natl
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Gibbons, 338 F. Supp. 430 (D.C.N.D. 1972);
Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Soules, 288 Ala. 163, 258 So. 2d 872 (1972); Vanguard Ins.
Co. v. Cantrell, 18 Ariz. App. 486, 503 P.2d 962 (1972); Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
8 Ariz. App. 272, 445 P.2d 474 (1968); Azar v. Employers Cas. Co., 178 Colo. 58,
495 P.2d 554 (1972); Mason v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 161 Colo. 442, 423 P.2d 24(1967); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 491
(Ky. 1970); Speziale v. Kohnke, 194 So. 2d 485 (La. 1967); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821 (1966); Raines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 9 N.C. App. 27, 175 S.E.2d 299 (1970); Norgaard v. Nodak, Mut. Ins. Co.,
201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1972).
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since all involved carriers are primary insurers with respect to their
individual risks. Hence, the Partridge case may offer some relief in an
area of protracted litigation concerning the relative rights and liabilities
of involved insurance carriers, much to the benefit of both the tortfeasor
faced with clear liability and the injured party seeking compensation.
In sum, the Partridge decision offers distinct advantages to both the
public and the practicing bar in the area of insurance litigation. Al-
though the case cannot presently be said to apply to as many instances
of insurance coverage as do the overlapping coverage cases, the advan-
tages inhering in the approach it espouses are well worth any additional
effort which may be required in a new case to convince a court of the
existence of factual similarities to Partridge.
